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I. INTRODUCTION
SomaFM began as a pirate radio station which first broadcast at the
1999 Burning Man Festival in the desert of Nevada,' and has risen to
become one of the largest "small" Internet-only radio stations, with over
one million listener hours per month.2 As stated by the creator of SomaFM,
the problem with modem radio broadcasting is that, "[b]ig radio's least-
common-denominator approach creates playlists that the least amount of
people will ever turn off. There's no personality, no edge. . . . The
challenge here is to do a lot with a little."3 SomaFM, which grew through
word of mouth and mailing lists, is an example of an enterprise springing
directly from the independent and pioneering mindset of the Internet.4 It is
also an example of the growing trend of listeners moving away from large,
sterile, modern AM/FM stations to the world of niche Internet radio with
more specialized audiences. Unfortunately, this area of Internet radio and
independent programming may soon die.
Radio programming is playing an increasingly important role in the
Internet world. By 1999, an estimated thirty-five percent of Americans,
approximately twenty-nine million, had tried streaming audio or video via
1. Burning Man, http://www.burningman.com (last visited Jan. 31, 2009).
2. SomaFM, http://www.somafm.com (last visited Jan. 31, 2009).
3. David Downs, The Day the Music Dies, S.F. WEEKLY, June 26, 2007,
http://www.sfweekly.com/2007-06-27/news/the-day-the-music-dies/.
4. Chris Coomey, Move Over, Pirate Radio-From a Bernal Heights Garage, Internet
Station SomaFM Plays Tunes for the Whole Wide World, and It's All Perfectly Legal, S.F.
CHRONICLE, June 30, 2004, at El, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f-/
c/a/2004/06130/DDGK07DJ65 1.DTL.
5. See Amanda S. Reid, Note, Play It Again Sam: Webcasters' Sound Recording
Complement as an Unconstitutional Restraint On Free Speech, 26 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 317 (2004); Sara J. O'Connell, Counting Down Another Music Marathon: Copyright
Arbitration Royalty Panels and the Case of Internet Radio, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
161, 162 (2004); see also Hear 2.0, http://www.hear2.com/2007/l /radio-listening.html
(Nov. 14, 2007).
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webcasts. 6 Unfortunately, due to an ever-increasing number of actions by
the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) and the Copyright
Royalty Board's (CRB) recent setting of royalty rates for webcasters, the
mix-tape genre of independent Internet radio may soon be gone. In March
2007, 7 the CRB issued a decision that substantially increased the fees
webcasters had to pay record labels through its royalty collection
organization, SoundExchange.8 The CRB set the minimum annual fees at
$500 per channel.9 Previously, the fee was $500 per service;' ° this was a
devastating rate hike. For example, after this fee increase, SomaFM's
royalty bill rose from $10,000 to $600,000 for the year of 2006.1 In effect,
this increase would make webcasting so prohibitively expensive that it
would put the vast majority of small webcasters out of business.
Only intellectual property law has had a more rapid growth than the
overall average for federal statutes in the time period between 1946 and
1994.12 Further, statutory expansion in copyright law has been more rapid
than in any other intellectual property field. 13 The problems dealt with in
this Note are directly related not only to this rapid expansion, but also to
the issues between lobbyists, copyright holders, and small businesses
wishing to use intellectual property rights without being priced out of
existence through the current economic rent system. A large part of the
current predicament is that, "given the very long copyright term and the
very low costs of duplication of many types of copyrighted work[s]" there
are greater potential rents from copyright than through the other areas of
intellectual property law. 14 Therefore, this potentially lucrative income
stream leads to much more aggressive lobbying and legal actions pursued
by copyright holders and their representatives.
Some legal scholars state that there is a public-choice explanation for
the net expansion of copyright law.'5 The argument is as follows: there is
an inherent asymmetry between the value that the creators of the
intellectual property place on the property right, and the value placed on the
6. See Allison Kidd, Recent Development, Mending the Tear in the Internet Radio
Community: A Call for a Legislative Band-Aid, 4 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 339, 340 (2003).
7. See, e.g., Downs, supra note 3.
8. Id.; see also SoundExchange, http://www.soundexchange.com (last visited Jan. 31,
2009).
9. See Downs, supra note 3.
10. Id
11. Id. (SomaFM's gross revenue was only $125,000 for that year).
12. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 2, available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20040608_
Landes.pdf.
13. Id. at 3.
14. Id. at 10.
15. Id. at 14.
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freedom to copy (without having to obtain a license) by would-be copiers. 16
If the copyright holder is able to enforce exclusive rights to the property,
then they have access to a vast possibility of economic rents. 17 In
comparison, a would-be copier or user of a copy, such as SomaFM, can
merely hope to obtain a competitive return for their use of the protected
property.18 This large profit potential makes it easier for copyright holders
to organize coalitions such as the RIAA to expand the legal protections of
intellectual property.' 9 An example of the difference in power between
coalitions such as the RIAA and those who wish to use the property right,
such as SomaFM, is that most of the statutory language of the Copyright
Act of 1976 "was not drafted by members of Congress or their staffs at
all."20 "Instead, the language evolved through a process of negotiation
among authors, publishers, and other parties with economic interests in the
property rights the statute defines.'
From this discussion, it is clear that there is a tremendous imbalance
of not only power, but also a vast disproportion of motivating forces. Those
who hold the property rights have already borne the cost of creation and
everything following is almost entirely profit; while those who wish to use
the property are fighting for mere competitive return. Unfortunately, the
lopsided balance of power in favor of the copyright holder has reduced the
possibility for such return and is ultimately choking off the ability of small
businesses to use copyright-protected works.22 Any resolution in this field
must take into consideration these underlying economic causes; therefore,
the solutions suggested in this Note have been crafted in light of the
financial realities of both the music business and copyright law.
This Note examines the issues affecting copyright holders and
webcasters while suggesting possible resolutions. Part II provides a basic
background of how webcasting works, copyright law, and the history of
performance rights. Part III describes the controversy, the legal issues, and
the current royalty rates and term structure. Lastly, Part IV discusses
possible areas of improvement, and addresses the need for modernization
of U.S. copyright law. 3
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
22. Id. at 23 (this article contains an excellent discussion of the problems in the legal
structuring of intellectual property as real property and the problems this causes).
23. See generally Kara M. Wolke, Some Catching Up To Do: How The United States,
In Refusing To Fully Sign On To The WPPT'S Public Performance Right In Sound
Recordings, Fell Behind The Protections Of Artists' Rights Recognized Elsewhere In This
Increasingly Global Music Community, 7 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 411 (2005).
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II. WEBCASTING AND COPYRIGHT LAW: A HISTORY
A. How Webcasting Works
Internet radio has the ability to provide many more listening choices
than traditional radio because of the potential for nearly unlimited
bandwidth, an almost infinite user base, and the ability of the average
person to set up and maintain a broadcasting station.24 Originally, due to
the lack of existing regulation, Internet stations were easy to set up and
manage, and the resulting programming could be broadcast to the entire
world.25 In fact, most stations have historically been run by "small
businesses, community and college broadcasters, and hobbyists. 26
Unlike typical Web sites which rely on a "pull" method of
transferring web pages where the page is not accessed or delivered until a
browser requests it, webcasting or "streaming" relies on a "push"
technology. 27 Regardless of whether anyone is requesting a song from the
site, it is continuously pushing the data out there for anyone to tune in.28
Music sent out using this technology transfers the data so that it is
processed by the listener's computer as a steady and continuous stream.29
This technology facilitates the performance of a song "via transmission
from the originating service, over the Internet, into a user's computer
RAM,30 and through the user's computer speakers. 31 Instead of being
permanently stored on a user's computer like downloaded songs, music
sent in this format is not meant to be permanent.32 Once the song is over,
the data from that song is erased and replaced by new data from the next
song on the playlist of the webcast.33 At the completion of the performance,
no remnants of the song remain in the listener's computer.34
B. Copyright Background
The purpose of intellectual property law in the United States is to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
24. See, e.g., Kidd, supra note 6.
25. Id.
26. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
27. Reid, supra note 5, at 321.
28. See generally, id.
29. Id.
30. Random access memory is a type of computer data storage. The word RAM is
mostly associated with types of memory where the information is lost when power is
switched off.
31. W. Jonathan Cardi, Ober-Middleman: Reshaping the Broken Landscape of Music
Copyright, 92 IOWA L. REv. 835, 860 (2007).
32. See Reid, supra note 5, at 321.
33. Id. at 322.
34. Id.
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Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries., 35 Copyright law protects "original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression. 3 6 Current music
copyright law actually entails two distinct types of copyright ownership.37
A copyright holder of the recorded performance of a song has rights in both
the (1) "musical composition," and (2) the "sound recording" itself.38 The
"musical composition" consists of the lyrics and the actual notes of the
song.39 An example of this would be the information someone would need
to reproduce the song on their own, such as the sheet music a pianist would
need to play Ludwig van Beethoven's Symphony No. 5. The "sound
recording" copyright differs because it "subsists in the actual fixation or
recording of the sounds," instead of the sheet music or lyrics.
40
The holder of a sound recording copyright has many of the same
rights as the copyright holder of a musical composition, but with some
significant differences. First, the copyright holder of a sound recording has
the right to reproduce the recording.41 Second, the holder of a sound
recording copyright has the right to prepare derivative works based upon
it.42 Third, the holder of the sound recording copyright has the right to
distribute phonorecords of the recording to the public.43
C. The Musical Work (Composition) Copyright and Mechanical
Compulsory Licensing
In 1831, Congress first added musical compositions to the categories
of copyrightable works.44 The world of music copyright "remained in [a]
relatively uncomplicated state for several decades. ' Rights began to
change in 1909 when Congress made some significant additions to music
copyright law. In response to the Supreme Court's decision in White Smith
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
36. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
37. Richard D. Rose, Connecting the Dots: Navigating the Laws and Licensing
Requirements of the Internet Music Revolution, 42 IDEA 313, 320 (2002).
38. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. 2002).
39. Howard Cockrill, Tuning the Dial on Internet Radio: The DPRA, The DMCA & The
General Public Performance Right in Sound Recordings, 9 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 103
(2005).
40. Reid, supra note 5, at 323.
41. See § 106.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Marcy Rauer Wagman & Rachel Ellen Kopp, The Digital Revolution Is Being
Downloaded: Why and How The Copyright Act Must Change to Accommodate an Ever-
Evolving Music Industry, 13 VmL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 271, 282 (2006).
45. Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 673,680 (2003).
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Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.,46 Congress expanded music copyright
protections through the Copyright Act of 1909, which subsequently
overturned the result of the Court by granting musical copyright holders the
right to control "mechanical reproductions" of their work.47
Perhaps the most revolutionary feature of that Act is that Congress
also subjected the mechanical reproduction right to a compulsory licensing
system. 48 The compulsory licensing process for mechanical reproductions
is relatively simple: once a copyright holder has authorized distribution of a
work to one member of the public, any other member of the public may
reproduce and distribute that work without needing to obtain permission
from the copyright holder.49
However, there is a stipulation that requires potential licensees to then
serve notice on the holder of the copyright and pay the statutorily
prescribed licensing royalties. 50 The compulsory license for mechanical
reproductions is still a part of the Copyright Act today, and is applicable to
CDs, cassettes, and other similar media.5' Congress also added a less
significant addition to music copyright by giving copyright holders a new
right to "arrange or adapt" 52 works that they had previously produced. This
additional right gave assignees of the composer's rights, quite often music
publishers, the right to control adaptations of the musical work.
5 3
The trade association of music publishers-The National Music
Publishers Association-created the Harry Fox Agency (HFA) 54 to issue
and administer mechanical licenses. 5 The HFA represents over 27,000
publishers, who represent the interests of more than 160,000 songwriters.56
This gives the HFA power to oversee the mechanical licensing, collection,
and mechanical royalty distribution of more than 2.5 million copyrighted
musical works.57 The great majority of copyrighted sound recordings are of
musical performances, and in many cases, musical sound recordings are not
46. 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908) (stating that under current copyright law, player piano rolls
did not constitute reproductions of musical compositions).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Cardi, supra note 31, at 843.
50. Id.
51. Loren, supra note 45, at 677 (the compulsory license provision is currently in
Section 115 of the Copyright Act).
52. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 1, § 1(b) (repealed by Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-553, 90 Stat. 2541) (granting the rights to copyright holders).
53. Id.
54. See generally About HFA, Harry Fox Agency, http://www.harryfox.com/public/
HFAHome.jsp (last visited Jan. 31, 2009).
55. Id.
56. Loren, supra note 45, at 682.
57. Id.
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owned by the original creator, but instead are owned by the five major
record labels: Universal Music Group, Sony Music Entertainment, Warner
Bros. Music, BMG Entertainment, and EMI Group.58 All of these record
labels, among others, are members of the RJAA.59
D. Digital Performance Right for Sound Recordings
The rapid growth of digital technologies that allowed the distribution
of high quality copies of recorded works brought about many changes in
copyright law.6° In the mid-1990s, representatives of the music industry
brought to the attention of Congress the rapid growth of such technologies
and their ability to monetarily injure the recording artists and copyright
holders.61 These representatives stated that their concern was the adverse
effect that this technology would have on the sales of CDs, tapes, and
records.62 They feared the possibility of the "erosion of copyright owners'
ability to control and be paid for the use of their work.,
63
The argument presented to Congress was that lack of control by the
copyright holder to limit the possible infringement of reproduction and
distribution would be extremely harmful to the industry.64 The labels also
maintained "that if online services could freely transmit recordings in any
manner they pleased, such performances would facilitate the creation of
infringing reproductions on users' computer hard drives." 65 The record
labels pushed for an exclusive right to digital performance which would
help limit the types of performances available and possibly offset the
infringement losses with royalties.66 Congress found these arguments
persuasive, and a digital performance right for sound recordings was
granted in the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995
(DPRSRA).67 This Act gave copyright holders of sound recordings the
58. Cardi, supra note 31, at 848.
59. Loren, supra note 45, at 686 (there are also three performing rights organizations
(PROs) that handle virtually all of the performance rights in musical compositions: the
American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP); Broadcast Music, Inc.
(BMI); and the Society of European Stage Authors & Composers (SESAC)).
60. See generally Lamberto 0. Abeleda, Jr., Digital Compensation: Recording Artists'
Collective Fight for True and Fair Compensation, 31 Sw. U. L. REv. 701 (2002).
61. Kidd, supra note 6, at 342.
62. Id.
63. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
64. Cardi, supra note 31, at 850.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Digital Performance Right In Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-
39, 109 Stat. 350 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). The Copyright
Act states that to transmit a performance is to "communicate it by any device or process
whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from which they are sent." 17
U.S.C. § 101. A digital transmission is defined as a "transmission in whole or in part a
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right "to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio
transmission."
68
Interestingly, the DPRSRA did not specifically address Internet radio
technology,69 although many of its implications and provisions drastically
altered current webcasting law. At the time the law was written, webcasting
was only an emerging technology since current Internet connection speeds
were far too slow to be utilized in any useful way.7° When the DPRSRA
was passed, the concern was not necessarily for P2P 71 (peer-to-peer)
services such as Napster, but for sites offering "audio on-demand" and
"pay-per-listen" services, which would be interactive sites that gave a
personal selection of music that would possibly diminish a user's interest in
purchasing a CD of their own.72
Although this was a victory for the representatives of the music
industry, the DPRSRA was not without criticism. Some have stated that the
DPRSRA is "one of the most convoluted and unreadable laws ever
passed.,73 Not only has it been criticized for its unreadable nature and
confusing construction, but due to heavy lobbying by the RIAA and other
music industry individuals, the passing of the Act has been construed as a
"perfect example of interest-group policymaking that has been the hallmark
of copyright legislation since the beginning of the twentieth century." 74
E. Multi-Tiered System
In an attempt to balance several significant industry interests,
Congress established a three-tiered system of copyright holder protection
with each tier tailored to the specific type of performance being used. The
system works as a varying means of protection depending on the likelihood
that the performance would facilitate violation of the copyright. 75 The
digital or other non-analog format." Id. Taken as a whole this means that to involve a
copyright holder's right, a sound recording must be sent via a digital means to a place
beyond where the sender is located. This sending then constitutes a public performance.
68. Loren, supra note 45, at 687 (citing DPRSRA § 2 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. § 106(6)).
69. Kidd, supra note 6, at 348 (citing 148 Cong. Rec. H7043 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 2002)
(statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner)).
70. Matt Jackson, From Broadcast To Webcast: Copyright Law and Streaming Media,
11 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 447, 457 (2003).
71. P2P (peer-to-peer) generally describes person-to-person data transfers through
services such as Napster, Grokster, BitTorrent, and others.
72. See S. REP. No. 104-128, at 14 (1995), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/
cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 104_congreports&docid=f:sr 128.104.pdf.
73. Jackson, supra note 70, at 455.
74. Id.
75. Cardi, supra note 31, at 850.
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following is a very basic description of the three tiers from most to least
protective.
1. Interactive Internet Transmissions
An interactive service transmission enables a member of the public to
receive a program specially tailored for the recipient, or if requested, a
particular sound recording.76 Under this tier, copyright holders receive the
greatest amount of protection, including full exclusive rights.7 A simple
example of an interactive service would be an Intemet site which would
allow the user to choose whatever song they would like to hear from a list.
Another example of an interactive service is one which allows the user to
narrow their listening selection down to songs by a single artist. 78 The
copyright holder of the sound recording is entitled to any price that they
might demand for the use of their recording, and can deny permission to
use it entirely.79
2. Non-interactive Internet Transmissions
A non-interactive Internet transmission is subject to compulsory
licensing if the transmissions conform to certain statutory requirements, but
if the service does not meet the statutory requirements then a compulsory
license is not available to the service.8° Instead, the service must negotiate
an individual license with the copyright holders of the sound recording
much like an interactive service.8' The statutory requirements are an
attempt to limit the possibility of an infringing use by the listeners of the
service. A good example of this is the webcast station Pandora82 which
does not allow users to select or listen to more than three tracks from the
same album or more than four tracks by one recording artist.
83
3. Non-subscription Broadcast Transmissions
These services are completely exempt from the digital performance
right for sound recordings, as they apply to analog (non-digital) over-the-
air transmissions.84 This provision simply restates the long-standing
agreement between radio stations and music copyright holders by
76. See 17 U.S.C. § 1140)(7) (2000).
77. Cardi, supra note 31, at 850.
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(3)).
80. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2).
81. Cardi, supra note 3 l, at 851.
82. See Pandora Radio: Listen to Free Internet Radio, Find New Music,
http://www.pandora.com (last visited Jan. 31, 2009).
83. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2)(C)(i).
84. § 114(d)(1)(A)-(B).
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exempting radio broadcasts from the digital performance right. However,
the RLAA has established that simultaneous webcasts of radio
transmissions do not fall under this exemption.85
II. THE DMCA AND A NEW ERA OF COPYRIGHT LAW
A. Digital Millennium Copyright Act
In 1998, after the initial rapid growth of the Internet (including
webcasting and improved streaming technologies and capabilities), it
became clear that the DPRSRA left many copyright issues unsettled;86 the
most significant of which was the dispute between the RIAA and services
providing streaming Internet radio broadcasts.87 As a result, Congress
decided to focus on clarifying how copyright law should apply to streaming
broadcasts.88 This was done by passing the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA) just three years after the DPRSRA's passage.
The DPRSRA originally included an exemption for "a non-
subscription transmission other than a retransmission. ' '89 In order to
appease the RIAA, Congress modified the exemption in § 114(d)(1) of the
Copyright Act, through the DMCA.90 Congress eliminated the exemption
and also extended statutory licensing to cover eligible non-subscription
transmissions (non-interactive webcasts). 9' Prior to these changes,92
webcasters were exempt from paying statutory fees. After the passage of a
last-minute addition to the DMCA, to qualify for a license, webcasters had
to conform to a detailed list of eligibility requirements.93 The following is
only a partial list of some of the requirements for webcasters under the
DMCA. Even though partial, it is an extremely burdensome list of
eligibility requirements for an area of broadcast run primarily by hobbyists
85. Cardi, supra note 31, at 852. In addition, the DPRSRA created three categories of
digital transmissions under this already confusing multi-tiered system. A short listing of the
categories includes: (1) exempt transmissions not requiring a license (non-subscription
broadcast transmissions), (2) nonexempt transmissions which are eligible for the statutory
license (non-interactive subscription transmissions), and (3) nonexempt transmissions which
are not eligible for a statutory license (interactive transmissions). See id.; 17 U.S.C. §
114(d)-(j).
86. Kidd, supra note 6, at 349.
87. Id.
88. Id. (citing Podcast: Internet 9: The Media and Entertainment World of Online
Consumers (Sept. 5, 2002) (archived at http://www.arbitron.com/onlineradio/studies.htm)).
89. Jackson, supra note 70, at 457 (internal quotations omitted).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Reid, supra note 5, at 326.
93. Joseph E. Magri, New Media-New Rules: The Digital Performance Right and
Streaming Media Over the Internet, 6 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAc. 55, 59 (2003).
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and small businesses. As Joseph Magri has noted, in order to be eligible for
the statutory license, the service must abide by the following:
1. Sound Recording Performance Complement. A Webcaster must
comply with the "sound recording performance complement," which
prohibits a Webcaster from transmitting within any given three hour
period: (A) more than three different songs from the same album if
more than two such songs are transmitted consecutively or (B) four
different songs by the same artist (or four different songs from the
same compilation) if more than three such songs are transmitted
consecutively.
2. No Prior Announcements. A Webcaster must not publish an advance
program schedule that discloses: (i) the titles of specific songs, (ii) the
names of albums or (iii) the names of artists to be transmitted (with
exception).
3. Programming Rules. A Webcaster's programming must also
comport with the following rules:
(a) Archived Programming. An archived program must be at least five-
hours long and cannot be made available for more than two weeks;
(b) Looped Programming. A continuously looped program must be at
least three-hours long.
(c) Rebroadcast Programming. A rebroadcast of an identifiable
program that contains songs, which are played in a predetermined
order (other than an archived or continuous program) and is less than
one-hour in length, can be transmitted no more than three times in any
two-week period when the program has been publicly announced in
advance (with exception) and no more than four times in any two-week
period when the program is one-hour or more in length (with
exception).
4. Prohibition of False Affiliation. The Webcaster must not knowingly
contemporaneously play or synchronize a song to visual images in a
manner that is likely to cause confusion as to the affiliation of the
copyright owner of the Sound Recording or the artist with the
Webcaster or a particular product or service.
5. Cooperate to Defeat Scanning. The Webcaster must cooperate to
prevent (to the extent feasible) listeners from automatically scanning
the Webcasters transmissions in order to select a particular song to be
transmitted (with exception).
6. Limit Duplication by Recipient. The Webcaster cannot affirmatively
cause or encourage the duplication of songs and if the Webcaster uses
technology that allows them to limit the ability to duplicate songs
directly in a digital format, the Webcaster must set such technology to
limit the ability to duplicate songs to the extent permitted by the
technology.
7. No Transmission of Bootleg Copies. The Webcaster must use Sound
Recordings that are legally sold to the public or authorized for
performance by the copyright owner of the Sound Recording and that
are legally manufactured (with exception).
8. Accommodate Technical Protection Measures. The Webcaster must
accommodate and cannot interfere with the transmission of technical
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measures that are widely used by copyright owners of Sound
Recording[s] to identify or protect copyrighted works if such measures
can be transmitted without imposing substantial costs on the Webcaster
or result in perceptible aural or visual degradation of the digital signal
(with exception).
9. Transmission of information. The Webcaster must display the title
of the song, the title of the album, and the featured recording artist to
the listener as the song is being played (with exception). 94
B. DMCA Fallout
Shortly after the DMCA was passed, traditional radio broadcasters
made the argument that simultaneous streaming broadcasts of "over the
air" transmissions 95 were exempt from licensing under § 1 14(d)(1)(A),
which exempted regular broadcast transmissions.96 The counterargument
presented by the RIAA was that the exemption was strictly and specifically
only for traditional radio broadcasts, and that any Internet streaming
programming must be licensed, "even if it is the identical programming
and source" of the radio broadcast.97 The Copyright Office ruled that
Internet radio transmissions by broadcast stations were not exempt from the
licensing requirements under the DMCA.98 The Copyright Office stated
that "the narrowly drawn safe harbors for retransmissions of radio signals
illustrate Congressional intent to distinguish between a traditional over-the-
air broadcast transmission of an AM/FM radio signal and a retransmission
of that signal."99
The Copyright Office argued that it would have been illogical to
believe that Congress would grant broadcasters an exemption for
simulcasting their AM/FM signals while requiring other parties to pay the
statutory licensing fees for the same signal.' ° Therefore, only traditional
over-the-air transmissions by broadcasters are exempt from the licensing
requirements of § 114 of the DMCA.'0 ' The radio broadcasters were not
satisfied with the ruling by the Copyright Office because they were also
streaming the same programming over the Internet. They appealed the
ruling in Bonneville International Corp. v. Peters.10 2 The court affirmed the
94. Id. (citing Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, § 405(a)(4)(B)); see also
Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 112, 114(j)(13)) [hereinafter DMCA]; Wolke, supra note 23.
95. This is also known as "simulcasting."
96. Jackson, supra note 70, at 459.
97. Id. at 460 (emphasis added).
98. Id.
99. Id. (quoting Public Performance of Sound Recordings: Definition of a Service, 65
Fed. Reg. 77,298 (Dec. 11, 2000) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201)).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 153 F. Supp. 2d 763 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
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ruling stating that, "it strains credulity to suggest that Congress intended to
exempt AM/FM streaming, which is global in nature, while simultaneously
limiting retransmissions to specific FCC-defined geographic areas."'
0 3
C. CARP Royalty Rates
Even though the DMCA and the Copyright Office's decisions were
attempts to settle the growing dispute between webcasters and the RIAA,
as well as other music industry parties, the disagreements continued. After
the DMCA was passed, the Copyright Office gave webcasters and record
companies an opportunity to negotiate royalty rates among themselves.
1°4
Initially, the RIAA offered a flat fee of $0.004 for each song streamed,
which was approximately fifteen percent of the webcasters' gross
revenue.' °5 The webcasters, specifically the Digital Media Association
(DiMA), 0 6 countered with an offer of $0.0015 per "listener hour."' 17 The
rates do not appear to be much different at first glance; however, they are
significantly different in practice. The following example clearly illustrates
the difference.
To start, imagine one hour of music, which equates to roughly ten
songs. Under the DiMA plan, that amount of air play would cost a
webcaster $0.0015 per listener. Under the RIAA's plan, each song
would cost $0.004, which would total $0.04 per listener hour for the
same number of songs. To continue this illustration, imagine a webcast
reaches 10,000 listeners per hour. Now, the DiMA plan equates to $15
per hour, while the RIAA plan equals $400 per hour. In a study
conducted of a successful radio station, research data provided
numbers tending to show that under the DiMA, a station would pay
roughly $192,000 per year. If the RIAA plan were to be adopted,
however, the same station would have to pay over $5.5 million.10 8
Neither side could agree to terms, so under Section 114 and Section
112 of the Copyright Act, a compulsory arbitration process was
conducted.' 09 The Copyright Office formed a Copyright Arbitration
Royalty Panel (CARP) to determine a schedule of rates and terms. °10 When
103. Id. at 776.
104. Kidd, supra note 6, at 361.
105. Jeremy Delibero, Note, Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels and the Webcasting
Controversy: The Antithesis of Good Alternative Dispute Resolution, 5 PEPP. Disp. RESOL.
L.J. 83, 93 (2005).
106. The Digital Media Association, http://www.digmedia.org (last visited Jan. 31,
2009). The DiMA was founded by seven leading web-centric companies, including Yahoo!
and AOL, to ensure that new media companies are not disadvantaged "merely because they
deliver content digitally or using the Internet rather than via print, film, terrestrial broadcast
or other traditional media." Id.
107. Delibero, supra note 105, at 94.
108. Id. at 94-95 (emphasis added).
109. Magri, supra note 93.
110. Id.
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the CARP convened, the arbitration process focused on three questions:
first, the determination of what royalty rate and terms should be instituted
for payments retroactive to the "effective" date of the DMCA; second, the
determination of a royalty rate for the next two years; and, lastly, what to
do about ephemeral"'. copies made in order to assist Internet webcasting.112
The process began on November 27, 1998 and ended on February 20,
2002 when the CARP made its report to the U.S. Copyright Office.'
13
During the rate-setting process, Yahoo!, Inc., one of the largest and most
lucrative Internet radio broadcasters, negotiated its own royalty rate
agreement with the RIAA.I 4 However, despite the deal cut by Yahoo!, the
vast majority of other webcasters would be bound by rates set by the
CARP. 1 5 As stipulated by the Copyright Act, the arbitration panel based
their rate decision on a "willing buyer/willing seller" standard.
1 16
D. Problems with the Willing Buyer/Willing Seller Standard
A significant obstacle to the application of a willing buyer/willing
seller standard was that, at this point in the history of Internet radio, there
was no existing market which the arbitration panel could use as a
benchmark. The only example of a possible market standard was that of the
Yahoo! settlement. 7  Therefore, the panel considered the Yahoo!
settlement (being representative of two parties with equal bargaining
power) as the sole basis for their decision of what a willing buyer/willing
seller standard would look like.118
To complicate matters further, the negotiated rates between Yahoo!
and the RIAA worked out to be overly advantageous for both, leading to a
skewed result."l 9 The final agreement between the parties specified that
Yahoo! would pay a high per-song fee for Internet-only transmissions, but
would pay a much lower rate for radio retransmissions-which made up
111. See David D. Oxenford, Davis Right Tremaine LLP, Internet Radio-The Basics Of
Music Royalty Obligations, BRDCST. ADVISORY BULL., June 20, 2007,
http://www.dwt.com/practc/broadcastibulletins/08-06_IntemetRadio.htm (stating that
ephemeral copies, also known as buffered copies are "[a] transient copy of the recording
that is made in any digital transmission process, as data is transmitted from server to server
and, theoretically, copies reside on the memory of a computer for at least some period of
time, no matter how short that time may be").
112. For an excellent discussion of the impact of the panel's decision on its own
disbandment and an overturn of the CARP process, see Delibero, supra note 105, at 93-99.
113. Id.
114. Kidd, supra note 6, at 373.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 351-52.
117. Id.
118. Id. at352.
119. Id.
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the vast majority of its webcasting business. 120 This rate agreement worked
out well for both parties; the RIAA was able to get extremely high rates for
performance royalties, which would adversely affect the willing
buyer/willing seller standard for CARP purposes, while Yahoo! was able to
maintain a lower rate for the majority of their business.'12 Small webcasters
believed that this system was rigged against the "little guy." As, Rusty
Hodge, General Manager and Program Director of SomaFM explains,
"[t]hey use a 'willing buyer/willing seller' system that doesn't ask, 'Which
buyer? Which seller?' They need something that takes into account the real
world." 1
22
E. CARP Rate Recommendations
Based on the rate agreement between the RIAA and Yahoo!, the
CARP established a rate of $0.0014 per performance for Internet-only
transmissions. 23 Simulcasts, or retransmissions of radio broadcasts, had a
rate of $0.0007 per performance. 124 Non-commercial broadcasters would be
charged $0.0002 per performance for simultaneous retransmissions of radio
broadcasts. 125 The response to the rate recommendations by small
webcasters was fear and shock. 126 Many small webcasters, such as KPG,127
ceased to broadcast after the announcement of the proposed fees by the
CARP. 28 Many other small webcasters shut down out of fear of being hit
with large royalty fees.
129
Following the CARP decision, both sides appealed.130 The RIAA
argued that the rates were set too low and the remaining webcasters argued
that the rates were set too high.' 3' On May 21, 2002, the Library of
Congress rejected the CARP recommendation.' 32 The Librarian of
Congress modified the rate to $0.0007 per performance for both Internet-
only webcasts, as well as for the simulcasts of traditional radio stations.
However, this did not appease the webcasters as the proposed rates would
still require many small webcasters to pay more in royalty fees than they
120. Id. at 352-53.
121. Id. at352.
122. Downs, supra note 3.
123. Kidd, supra note 6, at 352.
124. Id. at 353.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 354.
127. KPG was one of the oldest webcasting stations at the time. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Jackson, supra note 70, at 461.
131. Id.
132. Kidd, supra note 6, at 355.
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received in revenue. 133 There was much public outcry at the establishment
of rates, which led the webcasters to seek support from Congress.
34
F. Congressional Legislation
On September 26, 2002, Representative James Sensenbrenner (R-WI)
proposed the Small Webcaster Amendments Act of 2002 (SWAA).135 The
thrust of the Act was to place a six-month moratorium on the Librarian of
Congress's royalty rate decision to allow the parties additional time to
negotiate. 136 Thirteen webcasters and the RIAA entered into negotiations
which eventually lengthened the one paragraph bill of the SWAA into
thirty-plus pages, also including new royalty rates. 37 The newer version of
the SWAA required webcasters to pay royalties as a percentage of their
revenues instead of the previous per-performance and per-listener basis that
was proposed by the Librarian. 138 Although the rates were agreeable to the
thirteen webcasters involved in the negotiation, the other smaller
webcasters still feared high rates would put them out of business.
39
On October 7, 2002, the SWAA was passed and approved by the
House, thirteen days before webcasters were scheduled to pay four years of
back royalties to copyright holders.1 40 Following the passage of the SWAA
in the House, the Act was introduced in the Senate.' 4' On the day the
SWAA was scheduled for debate in the Senate, Senator Jesse Helms (R-
NC) introduced his own amendment to the SWAA that stopped
consideration of the previous version. Helms' amendment reintroduced the
idea of private negotiations between webcasters and copyright holders. 142
The amendment also gave SoundExchange-the division of the RIAA
which is responsible for royalty collections-the authority to negotiate
royalty rates with small webcasters. 143 The amendment divided webcasters
into two classes: noncommercial webcasters and small commercial
webcasters (including traditional Internet radio stations).'" If negotiations
with SoundExchange were unsuccessful, the amendment would force
133. Jackson, supra note 70, at 460.
134. Id.
135. Kidd, supra note 6, at 355.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 355-56.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 357.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 358.
143. Id.; see also SoundExchange, http://www.soundexchange.com (last visited Jan. 31,
2009).
144. Kidd, supra note 6, at 359.
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webcasters to make the royalty payments outlined by the Librarian of
Congress. 145 On October 8, 2002, both houses of Congress unanimously
passed the amended version of the SWAA, now known as the Small
Webcasters Settlement Act (SWSA).146
The negotiations between SoundExchange and Voice of
Webcasters 147 reached an agreement a few weeks later. 48 The agreement
stipulated that the webcasters must pay either eight percent of gross
revenues or five percent of expenses (whichever is greater) for the period
of time after the enactment of the DMCA through 2002. Further, for 2003
and 2004, webcasters paid either ten percent of the first $250,000 in
revenues and twelve percent of gross revenues above that amount or seven
percent of expenses, whichever was higher. 49 Every webcaster had to pay
the minimum amount of $500 per year for the period from the enactment of
the DMCA to the end of that year, and a minimum of $2,000 per year for
the years 1999 through 2002.150 Again, for 2003 and 2004, small
webcasters with gross revenues below $50,000 had to pay at least $2,000
per year.' 51 Those with gross revenues greater than $50,000 had to pay at
least $5,000 per year.' 52 Webcasters were allowed to choose between the
rates established through the negotiation or to pay the fees set by the
Librarian of Congress.
153
Even though it was a great improvement over the CARP rates and the
Librarian rates, the SWSA had other significant problems. As discussed
herein, the SWSA gave SoundExchange the power to negotiate all royalty
payment agreements. While this may not seem troubling on its face, the
considerable disparity between the bargaining power of SoundExchange
54
over small webcasters is extreme. This stipulation in the SWSA placed
small webcasters between a rock and hard place. They had to choose to opt
out of the royalty fees set by SoundExchange, which they likely could not
afford, or be forced to pay the rates established by the Librarian of
Congress, which were even higher. The fallout from the SWSA caused a
145. Id. at 359-60.
146. Id. at360&n.127.
147. Id. Voice of Webcasters is a coalition of small commercial webcasters formed to
promote diversity and quality of Internet radio, and to educate the public on Internet radio
issues. See Voice of Webcasters, http://www.voiceofwebcasters.org/ (last visited Jan. 31,
2009).
148. Kidd, supra note 6, at 361.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. SoundExchange operates as the collection arm of the RIAA. See SoundExchange,
http://www.soundexchange.com (last visited Jan. 31, 2009).
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schism in the webcasting community.155 The agreement had been
negotiated by larger, more lucrative webcasters, and although it was an
improvement to both the CARP rate and the Librarian of Congress rate, it
still did not effectively take into account the smallest of webcasters.156 In
particular, small webcasters such as SomaFM, would still face rates that
would put them off the air.1
57
IV. THE FORGOTIEN FEW
A. Internet Radio Post-SWSA
While the rates established under SWSA were a great improvement
over the previous rates, many webcasters still faced royalty rates that would
challenge their continued existence.158 Shortly after the passage of the
SWSA, many stations-such as WebRock.Net and CyberRadio2000-
announced the end of their streams. 5 9 There were other casualties as well.
Clear Channel, the nation's largest radio network at the time, stopped the
broadcast of approximately 150 of their stations after they learned that they
would have to pay webcasting fees in addition to their already established
budgets.
160
Even though Internet radio was dealt a severe blow from the drastic
increase in legislation, litigation, and statutory fee stipulations, the genre of
small webcasters still managed to survive. This is not, by any means, due to
the fee arrangements and litigation spurred along by the RIAA. Rather, it
was because of the drastic increase in listener base and increasing support
by the webcasting audience.' 6' Increases in technology, specifically
bandwidth capabilities and data compression, have had a dramatic effect on
the ability of the average person listen to webcasts on a regular basis.
Statistical data shows that as soon as 2004, following the rate agreement,
the number of Americans who streamed either audio or video at least once
a month increased by 27.5 percent. 162 Without such a dramatic increase in
user base and technology, in all likelihood, the era of Internet radio could
have been terminally damaged by the rates established by the Librarian of
Congress and the SWSA.
155. Kidd, supra note 6, at 362.
156. Id.
157. Id.; see also Downs, supra note 3.
158. See Emily D. Harwood, Note, Staying Afloat in the Internet Stream: How to Keep
Web Radio from Drowning in Digital Copyright Royalties, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 673, 674
(2004).
159. Id. at688.
160. Id. at 689.
161. Id. at 690.
162. Id. at 689.
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B. The "Changing" of the Guard
Congress decided in 2003 that it wanted a permanent body to set
royalty rates. 163 On March 27, 2003, Congressman Lamar Smith (R-TX)
introduced the Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act.164 The Act
phased out the CARP system by establishing the Copyright Royalty Board
(CRB). 165 Unsurprisingly, "[w]ebcasting royalty rates became the CRB's
first case.' 66 During the course of eighteen months, between 2005 and
2007, the CRB heard evidence and testimony from the RIAA, and the
DiMA on behalf of webcasters. 167 The litigation was an instant replay of
the issues which arose during the previous years:
SoundExchange asked for at least 30 percent of gross revenue and/or a
similarly increased rate for each song played per listener. DiMA went
the other way and [asked] for a decrease in royalties from 10.9 to 5.5
percent of gross revenues. Testimony and documents numbered in the
tens of thousands. Lawyers for both sides called dozens of economists,
industry spokespeople, and artists. Rebuttals occurred. The two sides
played a game of negotiation chicken, each making ridiculous demands
and refusing to budge. 
168
The ruling by the CRB came down on March 2, 2007, and granted
SoundExchange nearly everything they asked for.169 The CRB set new rates
for webcasting for the License Period of 2006 to 2010.170 The judges stated
that they based their rate hikes on the willing buyer/willing seller standard
as ordered by Congress. 171 The CRB decided that an individual record
company consisted of the basic unit of a willing seller. The current rate
system is now established with a yearly increase on a per-play and per-
listener basis. 1
72
Commercial Webcasters, Per Performance Rate'
Year 12006 2007 12008 12009 12010
Rate $0.0008 $0.0011 $0.0014 $0.0018 $0.0019
There is a minimum annual statutory fee of $500 per channel or
station, in addition to the above per-play fees. Noncommercial webcasters
163. See, e.g., Downs, supra note 3.
164. Harwood, supra note 163, at 692.
165. Erich Carey, We Interrupt This Broadcast: Will the Copyright Royalty Board's
March 2007 Rate Determination Proceedings Pull the Plug on Internet Radio?, 19
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 257, 283 (2008).
166. Downs, supra note 3, at 2.
167. Id.
168. Id. (emphasis added).
169. Id.
170. See generally Kidd, supra note 6.
171. See, e.g., Downs, supra note 3.
172. Carey, supra note 165, at 290.
173. Id.
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are still treated as a separate category under the new rates, but the basis
upon which they pay royalties has been changed. 74 Noncommercial
webcasters pay a minimum annual fee of $500 per channel or station. This
fee is applicable only if the webcasters conduct digital audio transmissions
below 159,140 aggregate tuning hours per month (ATH).' 75 If the
noncommercial webcaster exceeds this limit, they must pay additional
royalties at the same rate as that paid by commercial webcasters for digital
audio transmissions in excess of the cap. 176 The new rates make webcasters
pay between 50 and 1,000 percent of gross revenue.
177
The CRB issued an order on April 16, 2007 denying all motions for
rehearing. The order stated that there was no new evidence or clear error
warranting a reconsideration of the decision. 78 However, there were
changes to the CRB's Initial Determination. 179 First, the CRB amended the
decision to allow a transitional option for the years of 2006 and 2007.180
The webcasters, during this period, could continue to use ATH as a basis
for calculation and payment of royalties.' 81 This transitional period was
allowed in order to ease the shift in methodology and to facilitate the timely
payment of royalties. 82 The CRB expressly rejected the notion of
continued availability of this method as a permanent part of the royalty
structure. 
183
C. Internet Radio Equality Act
The Internet Radio Equality Act (IREA), a proposed form of
legislation in opposition to the Initial Determination of the CRB, is
currently before both the House of Representatives (H.R. 2060) and the
Senate (S. 1353).184 The bill would give webcasters the choice of paying
174. See Cydney A. Tune, Client Alert: Webcaster Music Royalty Rates-in Flux and on
the Rise, CLIENT ALERT: COPYRIGHTS MEDIA & ENTM'T INTELLECTUAL PROP. COMM.,
(Pillsbury, Winthrop, Shaw, Pittman, L.L.P., NEW YORK, N.Y.) June 15, 2007, at 2,
available at http://www.pillsburylaw.com/content/portal/publications/2007/6/2007
6158311946/Copyrights%20Media%2OEnt%201IP%20Communications%20Vol%20140 1%
20No%204018%2006-15-07.pdf.
175. Id. Aggregate tuning hours is a method whereby one listener who listens for one
hour would constitute one aggregate tuning hour, two listeners who each listen for a half
hour would also be one aggregate tuning hour, and so on.
176. Id.
177. See Downs, supra note 3.
178. Carey, supra note 165, at 285 & n.181.
179. Tune, supra note 174.
180. See Downs, supra note 3, at 2-3.
181. Id. at 3.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.; see also SaveNetRadio.Org, http://www.savenetradio.org/ (last visited Jan. 31,
2009).
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royalties of $0.33 per hour of sound recordings transmitted to a single
listener, or 7.5 percent of revenues received by the webcaster during that
year, or revenues that are directly related to the provider's digital
transmissions of sound recordings. 185 Further, the bill proposes a $500
minimum fee for each channel or broadcasting station.1 86 In comparison to
prior years beginning in 1998, the IREA (assuming the cost of 100 listeners
for four weeks at the average listening time of fourteen hours per week)
would allow webcasters to pay one-third of their previous rates. 187 The
proposed Act is gaining popularity, especially among small webcasters, but
its passage remains uncertain.
188
D. Negotiations
From the above discussion it is clear that small webcasters are the
party most affected by the established rates. It is estimated that the royalty
increase for most small webcasters could possibly reach as high as 1,200
percent of revenues. 189 In turn, this would force the vast majority of small
webcasters off the air and out of business. On May 21, 2008,
SoundExchange offered to reinstate the terms of the expired SWSA for the
2006 to 2010 period. 190 However, many small webcasters rejected this offer
as being only a temporary solution, and felt that it did not properly address
their major concerns. 191 This coalition of small webcasters supports a
scheme closely related to that of the Internet Radio Equality Act.192
E. Possible Solutions To Keep Internet Radio on the Air
As of the writing of this Note, no final rate agreement between
SoundExchange and webcasters has been reached; however, there have
been marked improvements in the dialogue between the two parties in an
effort to compromise. 93 SoundExchange has made offers to the webcasters,
that "[have] some problems, but the base rate is acceptable."' 94 In the
meantime, the small webcasters have verbally agreed to continue paying
185. Id. at 3.
186. Id.
187. See Ben Newhouse, Thoughts on the Internet Radio Equality Act, ROYALTY WEEK,
July 11, 2007, available at http://www.royaltyweek.com/issues/RoyaltyWeek_071107.pdf.
188. See Tune, supra note 174, at 4.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See Rusty on Radio, http://somafin.com/blogs/rusty/2008_01_01_archive.html (Jan.
22, 2008).
194. Id.
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the 2006 rates while the discussions continue. 95 The exact base rate and
proposed solution(s) are only available to those involved in the
negotiations. As a result, the solutions suggested in this Note are not based
upon the most recent terms currently under discussion by the involved
parties.
Since the beginning of the webcasting royalty rates, there have been
two key sticking points: (1) small webcasters have been largely ignored in
many of the key negotiations and considerations surrounding the rate
setting, and therefore have been dissatisfied with the process and resulting
rates; and (2) there is an ever-increasing market and burgeoning interest in
Internet radio. Quite simply, Internet radio is larger than ever and continues
to grow rapidly.
1. Jukebox Approach
Perhaps the broadest and simplest solution would be to explicitly
exempt "buffered"'196 music from copyright owners' reproduction rights
altogether. 97 This is not an entirely novel concept, as it is the current
approach adopted by the European Union.' 98 Similarly, it is the approach
Congress adopted when exempting jukebox operators from performance
royalties in 1909 because the songwriters were already compensated for the
reproduction necessary for that type of performance. 9 9 Not only does this
fairly compensate the copyright holders for the reproduction of their work,
but it also helps prevent the sort of "double dipping" that many believe the
RIAA seeks. It could also be extended further to protect cache copies, and
other ephemeral copies used in the process of digital performance via
streaming technology. 2°° The simplicity of this approach would be a radical
and welcome change to current copyright law.
While the RIAA may argue that there is still the possibility of perfect
copies being made from the digital streams, it has been well established
that "Internet radio, while the sound quality is good, in most cases, it's not
as good as the FM broadcast., 20 ' As Internet technology improves, there is
a rational fear held by copyright holders that users would use the better
195. Id.
196. Buffering refers to data stored temporarily to keep the music playing as a
continuous stream. See Streaming Audio: ots [sic] of Music, No Wait. Find Out How
Internet Radio Gets from the Web to Your PC Without Delay, PCWoRLD, Apr. 10, 2000,
http://www.pcworld.com/article/id,16060-page, l/article.html.
197. Cardi, supra note 31 at 867.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 867-68.
200. Id. at 867.
201. Katherine Mieszkowski, Web Radio's Last Stand, SALON.COM, Mar. 26, 2002,
http://dir.salon.com/story/tech/feature/2002/03/26/webradio/index.html.
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technology to capture and record the streaming audio from webcasts.
However, to prevent this, a simple cap could be imposed on all webcasters
that would not allow them to broadcast above a certain signal quality.
2. Elimination of Multiple Intermediaries
The reduction of transaction costs in the music business would allow
for higher revenues for the artists themselves. The elimination of the
multiple intermediaries that deal with copyright holders' individual rights is
a solution that would be beneficial to both sides. As discussed throughout
this Note, there are many players involved in the system-e.g., the HFA,
SoundExchange, the RIAA, and BMI. Specifically, Congress could
eliminate SoundExchange and other private organizations that collect and
distribute webcasting royalties and perform quasi-governmental
functions.2 °2 The creation of a neutral, detached party which could collect
and distribute the webcasters' royalties would allow for a reduction in the
fierce lobbying and would hopefully foster a system that could allow for a
rate-setting process that equally considers both parties' interests.203 The
desire for small businesses to thrive is an ideal that has a strong hold in the
American consciousness. A system that can help promote this paradigm, as
well as safeguard copyright holders' interests, would be beneficial to the
general public as well.
3. Satellite Radio Rates
Recently, the CRB handed down a decision establishing the rates for
music broadcast by satellite radio.2° Under the rates set for satellite
companies such as XM and Sirius,20 5 satellite broadcasters will pay a
performance license rate of six percent of certain revenue for sound
recordings played over their networks.206 They will also pay a performance
license rate of six percent of gross revenue subject to the fees of 2009,
which will then increase by 0.5 percent annually until reaching eight
percent in 2012.207 To put this into context alongside Internet radio, up until
2006, webcasters paid ten to twelve percent of their revenue in
performance license rates.20 8 Unless a new agreement is negotiated, the
current legislation indicates that most webcasting stations might have to
202. Susan A. Russell, The Struggle Over Webcasting-Where Is The Stream Carrying
Us?, 1 OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 13 (2004).
203. Id.
204. See Rusty on Radio, supra note 193.
205. Now a single broadcasting entity (Sirius XM Radio), as the two companies have
merged.
206. See Rusty on Radio, supra note 193.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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pay 300 to 600 percent of their revenues. It is a possibility that the fallout
caused by the punitive Internet radio rates led to the new lenient rates for
satellite radio instituted by the CRB.
A simple solution would be to match webcasting rates to those of
satellite radio. In comparison, the two technologies are similar in their
ability to broadcast to worldwide global audiences, while also being part of
an ever-advancing area of technology. If the two new broadcasting
technologies-satellite and Internet radio--were given rate parity, it would
be greatly beneficial to the parties involved. This revised rate structure
would allow for the growth of both mediums and would be economically
beneficial for the industry as a whole. The furtherance of any mode of
broadcast provides for the artists' music to be heard across an increasing
audience, and, in turn, generates increased revenue. Not only does this help
support the industry, but it also advances the primary purpose of copyright
law: to promote freedom of ideas and expression by granting protection to
the creators of those works for a limited time.
4. Revision of the DMCA
A more extreme possibility would be a revision of the DMCA either
20wholesale or in part. 09 One of the most positive aspects of Internet
technology is its ability to grow and expand. As the Internet has developed
from a mostly university-based technology to its current form, which is
available to nearly every individual who has a cell phone or a computer, the
need for the adaptation of law in this area has become increasingly
apparent. The passage of the DMCA itself, as well as the judicial system's
dealings with cases involving peer-to-peer programs such as Napster,
Grokster, and the like, shows the need for adaptation to current and future
changes. A rapidly changing technology demands a newfound perspective
from the legal community. Communication technology is no longer a
slowly evolving behemoth, but instead, is a quickly progressing facet of
everyday life. In light of this, the concerns and rationalizations behind the
passage of the DMCA in 1998 would likely be very different if considered
today. Therefore, adherence to such a technologically archaic legal
structure prohibits the free flow of information that the Internet not only
thrives upon, but demands.
Various authors have proposed a multitude of changes that would be
beneficial to the free flow of ideas as well as to copyright holders who
deserve to benefit from their original work of authorship. One of the
suggested revisions would be to rework the DMCA to allow webcasters
more opportunity to "voice their opinions and to participate in setting
209. For a thorough discussion of the topic, see Wagman & Kopp, supra note 44.
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royalty fees that [would be more] agreeable to the RIAA and
webcasters."2 10 The past practice of setting restrictively high fees and
hoping the parties would negotiate out of them imposes a high burden and a
severe reduction in bargaining power for the party wishing to use the
copyrighted material. This is not an effective way to resolve disputes, and
the current controversy illustrates this. Fortunately, it appears that a change
to the Copyright Act may be on the horizon.21'
V. CONCLUSION
The webcasting industry has been financially and legislatively abused
as a forerunner of rapidly advancing digital technology. This is an
unfortunate reaction by an old industry afraid of changing technology and
unwilling to modify its marketing strategy. In order to increase the flow of
ideas through the widening scope of technology, the legal system should
not be used as a club to set high rates and scare off entrepreneurs. Instead,
it should act as a mediator, encouraging the market while protecting the
rights of intellectual property holders. While some of the changes
suggested in this Note may not be possible to implement immediately, at
the very least, this Note defines the much needed change in the copyright
system as it currently exists.
The old adage of "if it's not broke, don't fix it" does not apply to
music copyright law in the information era. It is broken, and it desperately
needs to be fixed. Fortunately, it seems that both parties have come to
recognize this and are beginning to bridge the gaps in their disagreement.
Webcasting technology is not an affront to the music market; rather, it is a
logical and practical extension of the music business and should be viewed
in the same positive light as traditional radio broadcasting. It is an effective
tool for promoting artists and for advertising the music industry's product.
Once the RIAA and others realize this, hopefully the fear of this emerging
webcasting technology will diminish. Until then, Rusty Hodge and
SomaFM will continue broadcasting until "they send me a collection
notice. And then, I guess SomaFM will go bankrupt.,
212
210. Russell, supra note 202, at 16.
211. See Rusty on Radio, supra note 193.
212. Downs, supra note 3.
[Vol. 61
